The singular judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different.

In their logical quantity, all judgements of taste are singular judgements.

As a matter of fact, the judgement of taste is invariably laid down as a singular judgement upon the object.

Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones.

For, first, it has universal validity a priori, yet without having a logical universality according to concepts, but only the universality of a singular judgement.

Now the judgement, "The rose is agreeable" (to smell) is also, no doubt, an aesthetic and singular judgement, but then it is not one of taste but of sense.

For the same reason, also, all judgements of taste are singular judgements, for they unite their predicate of delight, not to a concept, but to a given singular empirical representation.

For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest.

In the same way, one who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of an object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of every one, although this judgement is empirical and a singular judgement.

Yet, by means of this very concept, it acquires at the same time validity for every one (but with each individual, no doubt, as a singular judgement immediately accompanying his intuition): because its determining ground lies, perhaps, in the concept of what may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity.

"Rational concept," "singular judgment" and "added significance" are some examples.

More's descent into vulgarity, as with his descent into persecution of heretics, must be seen, Ackroyd persuasively argues, in the context of More's singular judgment of what was going on in England in the 1530's.

Or at the very least I would find myself in possession of all sorts of incisive, singular judgments, like "Today America's best novels are being written by octogenarians," or "Albuquerque is currently the hub of a national literary renaissance."

The singular judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different.

In their logical quantity, all judgements of taste are singular judgements.

As a matter of fact, the judgement of taste is invariably laid down as a singular judgement upon the object.

Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones.

For, first, it has universal validity a priori, yet without having a logical universality according to concepts, but only the universality of a singular judgement.

Now the judgement, "The rose is agreeable" (to smell) is also, no doubt, an aesthetic and singular judgement, but then it is not one of taste but of sense.

For the same reason, also, all judgements of taste are singular judgements, for they unite their predicate of delight, not to a concept, but to a given singular empirical representation.

For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest.

In the same way, one who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of an object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of every one, although this judgement is empirical and a singular judgement.

Yet, by means of this very concept, it acquires at the same time validity for every one (but with each individual, no doubt, as a singular judgement immediately accompanying his intuition): because its determining ground lies, perhaps, in the concept of what may be regarded as the supersensible substrate of humanity.