backward induction

In game theory at large, this method is called backward induction.

The best way to choose a rifle is to use a process called backward induction.

Backward induction assumes that all future play will be rational.

Backward induction is a kind of game theory reasoning.

Here the prisoner reasons by backward induction, but seems to come to a false conclusion.

Therefore this Nash equilibrium can be eliminated by backward induction.

The standard solution to the centipede game is determined by backward induction.

Of course, this process of backward induction holds all the way back to the first competitor.

A counter-example was found where such a stable equilibrium did not satisfy backward induction.

The unexpected hanging paradox is a paradox related to backward induction.

Sequential games are often solved by backward induction.

The model is solved by backward induction.

They conclude that chess players are familiar with using backward induction reasoning and hence need less learning to reach the equilibrium.

Backward induction has been used to solve games as long as the field of game theory has existed.

Note, however, that the description of the problem assumes it is possible to surprise someone who is performing backward induction.

The algorithm (which is generally called backward induction or retrograde analysis) can be described recursively as follows.

A common method for determining subgame perfect equilibria in the case of a finite game is backward induction.

A generalization of backward induction is subgame perfection.

Mertens stable equilibria satisfy both forward induction and backward induction.

Backward induction posits that a player's optimal action now anticipates the optimality of his and others' future actions.

When solving dynamic optimization problems by numerical backward induction, the objective function must be computed for each combination of values.

Refinements have often been motivated by arguments for admissibility, backward induction, and forward induction.

In particular since completely mixed Nash equilibrium are sequential - such equilibria when they exist satisfy both forward and backward induction.

If every payoff is unique, for every player, this backward induction solution is unique.

In game theory, its application to (simpler) subgames in order to find a solution to the game is called backward induction.